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A STATUTORY MODEL
FOR CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY CONCERNS
Edward S. Adams*
John H. Matheson**
The modem corporation by its nature creates interdependencies with
a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate con-
cern, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and members of the
communities in which the corporation operates.
Corporate governance involves a system of contractual and fiduciary duties
that influence directors and officers to make decisions consistent with defined
obligations. This system requires that directors consider shareholders'
interests first and foremost in making corporate decisions because the share-
holders are the "owners" of the corporation. 2 Over the past several decades, a
number of states have implemented this policy by enacting constituency
statutes.3 These statutes transform the obligations of corporate directors by
expanding the groups to which boards of directors are accountable in
decisionmaking, greatly impacting the management decisions of business
firmus.4 Both legal and economic changes result from redefining the duties of
corporate directors, ultimately transforming American business.
* Howard E. Buhse Professor of Finance and Law and Co-Director of the Center for Business Law and
Entrepreneurship at the University of Minnesota Law School. M.B.A., Carlson School of Management at the
University of Minnesota (1997); J.D., University of Chicago (1988); B.A., Knox College (1985).
** S. Walter Richey Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Business Law and Entrepreneur-
ship at the University of Minnesota Law School; of counsel, Kaplan, Strangis and Kaplan, P.A. J.D., North-
western University (1977); B.S., Illinois State University (1974).
1 1 AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. f, at 57 (1994).
2 See R. Cammon Turner, Shareholders vs. the World: 'Revlon Duties' and State Constituency Statutes,
Bus. L. TODAY, JanJFeb. 1999, at 32, 33 (stating that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties exclusively to
the corporation, raising an obligation to act in the best interests of the shareholders).
3 See infra note 9.
4 See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO.
WASH. L REv. 14, 134 (1992) (stating that "[clonstituency statutes plainly were meant to expand the corpo-
rate fiduciary duty of care and the business judgment rule, and they should be applied accordingly"); see also
Lawrence E. Mitchell,A Theoretical and Practical Frameworkfor Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes,
70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 589 (1992) (illustrating how constituency statutes threaten to revolutionize generations
of corporation law by changing the established principle that directors owe fiduciary duties primarily to share-
holders); Turner, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that corporate governance has evolved to include consideration of
parties other than shareholders); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees As Stakeholders Under State Non-
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This development has engendered a hot debate about the desirability of
such a policy.5 This Article posits that the best solution is to simply offer a
choice to corporations, corporate management, shareholders, and stakeholders
by enacting an opt-out statute.6 An opt-out statute would create a default rule
that makes consideration of nonshareholder interests mandatory upon incorpo-
ration, but allows shareholders to amend the articles to favor themselves if they
so choose.
7
The Article will give a description of both the shareholder primacy model
and constituency statutes. However, because constituency statutes are rela-
tively new and corporate law has historically been based on the shareholder
primacy model, the Article will focus primarily on the policies behind and jus-
tification for constituency statutes. While we will provide a form of model
corporate constituency statute, we do not advocate one position over another.
Instead, we advocate the idea that corporations should begin as stakeholder-
centered, but then have a choice to focus on the shareholder if they decide to
do so.
I. UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Thirty-two states have adopted some form of constituency statute, exempli-
fying the prominence of constituency statutes' underlying principles.9 In gen-
shareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45,47 (1991) (stating that constituency statutes create
fiduciary duties on the part of directors to stakeholders other than shareholders); Gary von Stange, Corporate
Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461,462 (1994)
(explaining that the new corporate social responsibility created by constituency statutes threatens to change
traditional fiduciary duties of the board of directors).
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 See infra Part VII.
7 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (comparing mandatory, permissive, and opt-in constitu-
ency statutes).
8 See infra Part II and note 30 and accompanying text.
9 See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Bal-
anced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1520 (1991) (showing that, as of 1991, the follow-
ing states each had adopted some form of constituency statute: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Since then, four
states, Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, and Vermont, have added statutes while one state, Connecticut, re-
pealed its statute. See, e.g., ARz REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830
(West 1993 & Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1994 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-35
(1993 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-1602 (1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (West 1999); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (west 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
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eral, "[c]onstituency statutes purport to allow directors of public corporations
to consider an expanded group of 'interests' when making decisions on behalf
of the corporation or, more precisely, decisions concerning the course of the
corporation's business."'1  "The interests defined vary from state to state, but
always include interests beyond shareholders, the primary group to whom di-
rectors must traditionally answer."
l l
In fact, some "constituency statutes" allow directors to virtually consider
the world in arriving at control transaction decisions. 12 The Minnesota statute
is illustrative, stating that:
[A] director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers,
suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, com-
munity and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as
short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders including
the possibility that these interests might be best served by the contin-
ued independence of the corporation.1
3
§ 271B.12-210 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1981 & Supp. 2000); MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-104(9) (1999 &
Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985
& Supp. 2001); MiSS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MO. REV. STAT. 351.347 (1986); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138 (Michie 1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1
(West 1969 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (Michie 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1995 & Supp. 1999); OIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1715 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.2-8 (1999); S.D. CODn'sED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michie 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (1997 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (Mi-
chie 1999); see also infra Appendix.
10 Jonathan R. Macey, FiduciaryDuties As Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituen-
ciesfrom a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999) (arguing that nexus-of-contract
theory allows shareholders and stakeholders to revise their fiduciary duties via contracts).
1 Orts, supra note 4, at 26-27 (stating that the interests directors must consider under constituency stat-
utes include those of suppliers, customers, employees, creditors, and the community in which the corporation
conducts its primary business); see also Wai Shun Wilson Leung, Comment, The Inadequacy of Shareholder
Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Nonshareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 587 (1997) (arguing that the existing corporate regime in which maximizing shareholder profits is the
overriding duty of management should be replaced with mandate that boards must consider equally the inter-
ests of stakeholders and shareholders when decisions can affect both groups).
12 These statutes were originally designed to provide target company boards of directors more leeway in
fending off hostile takeovers. See Matheson and Olson, supra note 9, at 1450 ("One scholar asserts that these
statutes 'vesting of such extraordinarily broad discretion in a board' likely affirms the 'just say no' defense.");
see also Thomas J. Andre, Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market for Corporate
Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 573 (1990). Directors' duties statutes potentially provide directors with
much greater leeway in rejecting tender offers than current case law.
13 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (West Supp. 1985).
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The effect of this legislation is to help shield directors from liability by
expanding the criteria that directors may consider in reaching corporate
decisions. Notions of corporate governance and director duties are expanding
to consider the desires of a wider group of individuals. This change is
exemplified by the adoption of constituency statutes.
A. Scope of Constituency Statutes
Despite the traditional view of shareholders as "owners" of corporations
whose interests are superior to all others, no state corporation code in existence
specifies that the directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty solely to the
shareholders.14 Accordingly, each state implicitly recognizes that a broader
group of interests may be considered even absent any constituency statute in its
code.15 Constituency statutes transform this implicit principle into an explicit
proviso of the law, minimizing ambiguity as to the breadth of directors' re-
sponsibilities by explicitly delineating the groups of individuals to whom
directors are accountable.
The breadth of interests that a board of directors or a corporation's officers
may consider in making corporate decisions is the defining characteristic of
constituency statutes.' 6 While all directors' duties statutes use similar
language, they exhibit several strands of variation: (1) the breadth of factors
directors may consider;17 (2) the applicable contexts in which nonshareholder
interests may be considered (e.g., some states limit application to takeover
contexts);' 8 (3) the corporate fiduciaries protected by the statute (e.g., Illinois's
statute protects officers of a corporation);19 (4) the nonshareholders specifically
protected (e.g., Wyoming's statute provides for specific protection to
bondholders in a takeover context);20 (5) the level of protection: Indiana and
Pennsylvania have enacted statutes that enhance protection of a board's
21decision. With respect to applicability, these statutes have taken threeprimary forms: permissive, which is the form adopted by the majority of the
14 Steven M.H. Waltman, The Proper Interpretation of corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation
of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 163, 166 (1991) (noting that a few corporation codes specify that di-
rectors have a duty to the corporation and its shareholders).
15 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that legislative inaction can be
construed as legislative opinion).
16 See von Stange, supra note 4, at 479-80.
17 See infra Appendix.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
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jurisdictions promulgating constituency laws;22 mandatory, which has thus far
been adopted only in Connecticut; 23 and opt-in, found only in Georgia.
24
Permissive statutes authorize directors to consider a wider group of inter-
ests when making corporate decisions if they so choose. Accordingly, permis-
sive statutes allow consideration of stakeholder interests without demanding
it. 2 They do not require any further corporate action before contemplation of
stakeholder interests can be included.26 Mandating statutes strictly require di-
rectors to take into account a wider group of interests when making corporate
decisions.27 Instead of granting authority, these statutes impose a strict obliga-
tion on directors to consider stakeholder interests in decisionmaking. 28 Opt-in
statutes merely give an individual corporation the option either to invoke the
coverage of the state's constituency statute in its articles of incorporation, or to
forgo governance by the statute through neglecting that election.29 Such a stat-
ute does not grant authority to the board to consider stakeholder interests
unless the corporation specifically elects to be governed by the statute in its ar-
ticles of incorporation. Though they differ in their practical application to
corporate governance, each of these types of constituency statutes is plainly
meant to expand the corporate fiduciary duty of care to encompass interests
beyond those of the shareholders of the corporation.
22 See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT § 10-2702 (Vest 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (West 1993 & Supp.
2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1993 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-1602 (1999); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/8.85 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Michie 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West
1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92
(West 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1981 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
156B, § 65 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001); Mss.
CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MO. REV. STAT. 351.347 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West 1969 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (Michie 1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2001); OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson
1997 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 1995); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-33-4 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1999); ViS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 17-16-830 (Michie 1999).
23 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 1997).
24 See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1994).
25 See supra note 23.
26 See id.
27 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (Vest 1997).
21 See id.
29 See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1994).
30 See id.
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B. Historical Debate over the Consideration of Multiple Constituencies
Consideration of multiple constituencies grew out of an ongoing debate
between fundamental viewpoints-those of traditionalists and constructionists.
This debate was best noted in the popular arguments between Professors Adolf
Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s.31 Berle and other traditionalists urged
primacy of shareholder interests because shareholders are traditionally the
parties to which directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to return their
32initial investment. Because a conflict of interest arises when directors and
officers consider interests other than those of shareholders, the traditionalist
viewpoint demands that only one group's interests-the shareholders'-
constitute the focus of director decisionmaking.
33
Dodd and other constructionists, on the other hand, urged consideration of
the interests of various corporate constituents, including both shareholders and
stakeholders. 34  They recognized that the corporation consists of many indi-
viduals with a stake in the firm's welfare, such as employees, suppliers, and
creditors, and the general public.35 Accordingly, the constructionists sought to
include the interests of these individuals in decisionmaking in addition to the
36interests of shareholders.
The following diagram demonstrates the increased complexity of the deci-
sionmaking process of a corporation under the constituency statute regime of
the constructionists:
31 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
971-72 (1992) (illustrating the clashing of traditionalist and constructionist viewpoints exemplified by Profes-
sors Berle and Dodd).
32 See id. at 972 (illustrating that Professor Berle espoused the traditionalist viewpoint that "the board of
directors should operate the corporation for the sole benefit of the shareholders .... [C]orporate concern for
nonshareholder interests is appropriate only if shareholder interests are thereby advanced.").
33 See id.
34 See id. at 972-73 (noting that Professor Dodd espoused the constructionist viewpoint that shareholders
are really absentee owners whose interests can be subjugated to those of other stakeholders, including the
community in which the corporation operates).
35 See id. at 973.
36 See id.
[Vol, 49
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TRADITIONAL REGIME
DIRECTORS
SHAREHOLDERS
CONSTITUENCY STATUTE REGIME
While the constructionist viewpoint broadens the interests informing
directors' decisions, it also complicates decisionmaking by increasing the
factors directors must consider before arriving at corporate decisions.
37
Pecuniary interests of shareholders often conflict with and oppose the interests
of employees and the general public, increasing the complexity of director38
decisions. The principles underlying constituency statutes have permeated
corporate ideals in the United States for decades. Corporate society in the
1930s debated the validity of the "corporate social responsibility" principle.39
This ideal urged corporations to recognize a duty of "trusteeship" or
"responsibility" toward social interests beyond those of shareholders.
40
37 See Wiliam J. Camey Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 419 (1990).
38 See Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes and Corporate Govern-
ance, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 777, 779 (1994).
39 See Orts, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that constituency statutes revitalize an older debate concerning
"corporate social responsibility" by reviving the classic dispute concerning the parties for whom corporate
managers are trustees); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 598 n.94 (noting a number of early cases articulating man-
agement's fiduciary duties as being owed to creditors as well as to shareholders and the corporation generally).
See, e.g., Koehler v. The Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715,720-21 (1862); Union Nat'l Bank
v. Douglass, 24 F. Cas. 621, 624 (C.C. Iowa 1877); Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co., 26 N.W. 184, 186-87
(Wis. 1885).
40 Orts, supra note 4, at 21-22.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
In the 1970s, corporate managers recognized that executives "should
consciously make decisions that balance the often competing ... claims of
shareholders, employees, customers, and the general public. '41 Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, corporations adopted this standard through "corporate
charter amendments" altering the considerations of directors in making
corporate decisions.42 These amendments authorized directors to consider the
social and economic effects of acquisitions on a company's employees,
suppliers, and customers, in much the same manner as constituency statutes.
43
Delaware common law recognizes that a board has no duty to maximize
short-term value for its shareholders. As long as there is a rationally related
benefit for the shareholders in the long run, however, a board may consider the
interests of nonshareholder constituencies.44 Even Ralph Nader once proposed
that corporations should have specific directors devoted solely to voicing the
interests of constituents, as opposed to the interests of shareholders. 45 Though
this approach never became widely adopted, it reflects a historical trend toward
modem constituency statutes and the principles reflected in Delaware corpo-
rate law. Constituency statutes do not represent a new invention attempting to
penetrate corporate legal regimes, but instead constitute an innovative means to
express the ideals embraced by corporate America throughout the twentieth
century.
C. Antitakeover Genesis of Modern Constituency Statutes
Despite some interesting historical antecedents, the modem adoption of
constituency statutes has its impetus in the desire to give a target company's
41 Id. at 22 (quoting from LEONARD SILK & DAVID VOGEL, ETHICS AND PROFITS: THE CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN BUSINESs 134 (1976) (illustrating how companies in the mid-1970s often followed
a version of corporate social responsibility specifically defined in terms of "stakeholders" or the "corporate
constituency')).
42 Ronn S. Davids, Comment, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Transition
Costs?, 28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 145, 152 (1995) (quoting Control Data Corporation's charter amend-
ment and illustrating how it broadened the factors directors could consider in change of control circum-
stances).
43 Control Data Corporation was the first entity to adopt such an amendment in 1978. See id.
44 See Turner, supra note 2, at 33 (noting, however, that, in a change of control situation, directors are
prohibited from considering the interests of nonshareholders, and doing so may constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty). See also Davids, supra note 42, at 172 (discussing the ABA's rejection of a rule allowing directors to
consider nonshareholder interests without relating such consideration in some manner to shareholder welfare),
45 See Al Myers, Whom May the Corporation Serve?-An Argument for the Constitutionality of Non-
Stockholder Constituency Statutes, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 449,451 (1994) (illustrating that ideas supporting
the appointment of directors devoted solely to the interests of nonstakeholders received significant support
from the advent of constituency statutes in the 1970s).
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board of directors, fighting a hostile takeover, a broader base of interests to
consider than just the corporation and its shareholders.46 "The scope of con-
stituency statutes appears so far to be limited to cases that involve corporate
takeover decisions. This finding is not surprising, given that the statutes were
specifically designed and intended as a type of antitakeover statute."47  The
frenzy of takeovers in the 1980s resulted in corporations developing and adopt-
ing many defensive tactics to repel takeover attempts. Constituency statutes
are the culmination of various antitakeover statutes adopted by states over the
past several decades to bolster corporate defensive arsenals. The predecessors
of constituency statutes include control share statutes, 48 fair price statutes, 49
poison pill-shareholder rights statutes, cash out statutes,51 disgorgement stat-
utes,52 and antigreenmail statutes.53 Constituency statutes improve upon these
measures by giving the stakeholders actual rights, rather than relying on direc-
tors' compassion. Enacting constituency statutes through a statutory frame-
46 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 9, at 1448-50; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the
Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1156, 1165 (arguing that the danger of directorial self-interests
necessitates the consideration of nonshareholder constituencies); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 606 (explaining that
a major benefit of constituency statutes is their chilling effect on directorial self-interests which usurp corpo-
rate assets and opportunities).
47 Orts, supra note 4, at 35 (noting further that the relative absence of hostile takeovers in the late 1980s
and early 1990s prevents an accurate determination of the effectiveness of constituency statutes designed only
as antitakeover measures). See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92 (West 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. 351.347 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-103-204 (1995).
48 See Orts, supra note 4, at 38 n.127 (stating that "[c]ontrol share statutes provide that a majority of a
corporation's shareholders must approve the acquisition of a statutorily defined 'control share,' which is usu-
ally defined to begin at twenty percent of outstanding shares. If the shareholders do not approve, the 'control
block' of shares is stripped of voting rights, thus preventing a takeover.").
49 See id at 38 n.137 (providing that "'[Flair price' statutes ... require, at the 'back-end' stage of a two-
step acquisition, either (1) supermajority shareholder vote approving the step, or (2) payment of a statutorily
defined 'fair price' to shareholders who did not initially tender into the offer.").
50 See id. at 38 n.149 (explaining that poison pill provisions distribute to shareholders a right to purchase
shares of the target corporation at a substantial discount in the event of an unsolicited merger or acquisition.
These provisions effectively increase the number of shares of the target company, which increases the price the
acquiring company must pay to purchase the targeted entity.).
51 See id. at 39 n.142 ("[Clash out' statutes provide that an acquiror of a controlling interest of a
corporation's shares must, upon demand by the other shareholders, purchase the remaining shares at a price
reflecting the premium paid for the initially acquired shares.").
52 See id. at 39 n.1 43 (illustrating that disgorgement statutes adapt the "short swing" policies of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Act of 1934 by seeking to "recover profits made within short-term prohibited periods by
'speculators' or 'greenmailers' who put a company 'in play' and then sell out their stakes at a vastly increased
price.") (citations omitted).
53 See id at 39 n.141 (noting that .'Antigreenmail' statutes provide that corporations may not purchase
shares from a person who owns more than a specified percentage (usually three to five percent) of outstanding
shares unless the purchase is either (1) preapproved by a majority vote of disinterested shareholders, or (2)
offered at the same terms to all outstanding shareholders").
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work such as the one proposed by this Article provides even more protection
by conferring a legal cause of action upon stakeholders.
Constituency statutes purport to change the duty of care of officers and di-
rectors while creating judicial standards for reviewing nonstatutory antitake-
over devices such as poison pills.54 Whereas many of the early antitakeover
devices imposed limitations on entities attempting an unsolicited purchase of
another firm without addressing the duties of directors for the target firm,55
constituency statutes may be expanded to apply outside the context of hostile
takeovers to influence everyday board decisions. These improvements suggest
that constituency statutes enhance and codify widely accepted legal princi-
ples.
56
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MODEL
The traditional view of corporate law commands directors to make deci-
sions that will maximize shareholder wealth.57
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-
distribution of rofits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.
This unabashed appeal to greed is defensible only because corporations have
value themselves. The question then becomes what the most efficient way is
54 See MarkE. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L.
27, 32 (1996) (discussing case law and statutes that give legal standing to stakeholders).
55 See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L REV. 111 (1987) (dis-
cussing some of the features of second generation antitakeover statutes and the political maneuvering that en-
acted them).
56 See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Searchfor Perspective, 46 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1375
(1991).
57 See Orts, supra note 4, at 26 (explaining the classic argument for shareholder primacy, as expounded
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)); see also Turner, supra note 2, at 34 (arguing that
the absence of a shareholder primacy requirement in constituency statutes is a "controversial leap away from
traditional corporate governance law").
58 Orts, supra note 4, at 27.
59 See William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency
Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1449 (1993) ("Shareholder wealth maximization by managers who play the
role of agent is a norm because it is assumed to be the means to the end of maximum wealth for the society as
[Vol. 49
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to manage the corporation. Many commentators believe the shareholder
wealth maximization model is the best way of achieving this goal.
60
Not only do opponents believe constituency statutes are contradictory to
notions of shareholder supremacy, some argue that existing law already ade-
quately protects the interests of stakeholders.6 Creditors are protected by their
contracts and Uniform Commercial Code provisions dealing with fraudulent
conveyances and bulk transfers. Employees are protected by collective bar-
gaining agreements, employment contracts, and wage, safety, and health
laws.62 Furthermore, the market gives stakeholders a certain level of protec-
tion.63 These protections do not fully insulate stakeholders from the decisions
of corporate management, but they put stakeholders in a better position to de-
fend themselves than shareholders. Shareholders need this protection be-
cause of the disconnect between ownership and control. 65 Because the share-
holders own the company through owning stock, but do not have direct control
of the corporation, managers need incentives to favor the shareholders. 66 The
proposed statutory framework deals with these concerns by conferring standing
upon stakeholders through a mandatory system and providing them with a leg-
islative or statutory avenue for enforcement of their interests.67 Consideration
of many groups' needs and desires may be a challenging task, but mandating
this process forces boards to consider the long-term interests of the corporation
over those of any single group.
a whole. It is not itself the end in view. Its ethical power derives from the fact that, in a world of scarcity,
more is better than less.").
60 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403
(1983) ("[As the] [riesidual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives ... to
make discretionary decisions. The firm should invest in new products plants, etc., until the gains and costs are
identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives.").
61 See James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21
STETSON L. REv. 97, 115 (1991) (asserting that stakeholder groups have protections other than constituency
statutes already available).
62 See id. at 116 (demonstrating other protections available for stakeholders).
63 See Carney, supra note 37, at 423 (stating that "[p~lant closings are costly for employers, too. They
represent abandonment of an investment in a specific asset which may have very little salvage value.").
64 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETsON L. REV. 23, 36-39 (1991) (arguing that of
all groups, shareholders face the most severe contracting problems).
65 See Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
66 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247,258-59 (1999).
67 See infra Part VII.
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IT[. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Criticisms of constituency statutes come from several angles. Throughout
history, regimes favoring consideration of stakeholder interests have con-
fronted constitutional as well as economic and legal challenges.68 Milton
Friedman even went so far as to call the doctrine of stakeholder social respon-
sibility a "fundamentally subversive doctrine." 69  These animadversions
against constituency statutes, however, are not themselves impervious to criti-
cism.
Opponents argue that constituency statutes violate the Contracts Clause of
the United States Constitution.70  The modem trend in state law is to view the
corporation as a "nexus of contracts" involving various constituents, including
shareholders, directors, managers, and employees. 71  The foremost aspect of
these contracts, they argue, is the predominance of shareholder interests.
72
They argue that any state law impairing these previously existing contracts
among shareholders, directors, and their corporations violates the legitimate
expectations of those groups and, therefore, must be declared unconstitutional
under the Contracts Clause.73  However, "[o]ver the last two centuries, the
[Supreme] Court has been unwilling to read the contracts clause as a strict
68 See infra notes 71-113 and accompanying text.
69 See Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities Under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1451, 1451
(1990), (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrAUsM AND FREEDOM 133 (1982) ("[F]ew trends could so thor-
oughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social
responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible.")).
70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1; Orts, supra note 4, at 67 (stating that, despite the fact that courts
might consider contract clause arguments against constituency statutes frivolous, opponents nonetheless assert
the legislation violates a strict interpretation of the contract clause).
71 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 767, 770 (1989) (recognizing that corporate governance arrangements are contracts); Myers, supra note
45, at 459 (noting that the central question is whether corporations represent contractual relationships in and of
themselves); Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes
Under the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1998) (asserting that corporations constitute a nexus of con-
tracts); cf. Bratton, supra note 59, at 1460-66 (positing that legal recognition of constituency rights causes
ethical problems due to the fact that constituents have only implicit contracts which do not give rise to legal
rights).
72 See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 71, at 770.
73 See id. at 800 (arguing that constituency statutes cannot be sustained as "reasonable and necessary" to
protect a public interest); Myers, supra note 45, at 462 (demonstrating that few, but some, commentators have
attempted to assert that shareholders' contracts with the corporation are violated because equity owners would
not normally willingly give up their rights under traditional regimes).
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limitation on government regulation that affects pre-existing contracts." 74 In
addition, the relationship between shareholders and corporations is not a con-
tractual one in the ordinary sense, because contracts attempt to reduce risk.75
However, there is inherent risk in equity that defies the risk reduction aspect of
contracts.
For example, all states can amend their corporate statutes at any time, and
shareholders knowingly accept this as a risk implicit in their investments.
76
Constituency statutes can only be defeated by the Contracts Clause if such
statutes cause the shareholders to suffer some loss in their investment or some
other real effect as a result of the alteration of contractual rights. In reality, we
cannot assume that corporations governed by constituency statutes will make
any less money and therefore confer any less benefit on shareholders than will
corporations operating free of constituency statutes.77 Therefore, the Contracts
Clause argument against constituency statutes is also without legal justifica-
tion.
Opponents also argue that requiring that corporations consider the interests
of parties other than shareholders constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.78 They say this constitutes a taking because
shareholders' legal claim to the residual interest of the firm is reduced by
consideration of constituent interests, which reassigns property rights from
shareholders to stakeholders.79 Corporations do not have the right to alter their
form at will because such uncontemplated alterations will inevitably upset
shareholder reliance, leading to a derogation in their property rights as equity
holders. A taking does not exist, however, unless the expectations of
shareholders are altered as a result of the government's activities.80  No real
74 Orts, supra note 4, at 69 n.357, (illustrating how "the very lack of a stopping point constitutes a princi-
pal reason why courts are unlikely to strike down state corporate statutes on Contract Clause grounds.") (quot-
ing Ronald D. Rotunda, The Impairment of the Contracts Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
809, 811 (1989)).
75 See Larry Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Perfornance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO.
L. REV. 71, 131 (1998).
76 See Myers, supra note 45, at 460 (stating that an implied term of state incorporation laws is that the
provisions of those laws may be amended at any time).
77 See id. at 461 (noting that because companies do not make any less money when considering non-
shareholder interests, it is questionable whether shareholders suffer any real harm due to constituency statutes).
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Oswald, supra note 71, at 21-22 (demonstrating that shareholders invest
their capital in the firm with the expectation that their "interests will be protected by the state" and "constitu-
ency statutes upset those expectations").
79 See id. at 21-23 (arguing that such an act must be "accompanied by just compensation or be struck
down as a taking").
80 See id.
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evidence exists to suggest that constituency statutes negatively alter share-
holder expectations. 1 Moreover, constituency statutes do not strip share-
holders of the entire value of their stock; they merely limit the preferential
treatment of shareholder interests.82 "L]egislation which reallocates benefits
and burdens among private parties, but which is nonetheless intended to
achieve a public purpose, will not amount to a taking." 3  Accordingly, a
challenge against constituency statutes based on the Takings Clause cannot be
sustained.
One might also contend that the Williams Act, as a result of federal pre-
emptive law, forbids states from passing constituency statutes. The Williams
Act regulates tender offers by requiring firms to disclose information about po-
tential takeovers and by establishing procedural rules to govern tender offers.
84
By also regulating decisions by directors in the takeover context, constituency
statutes potentially run afoul of the Williams Act provisions and policies, vio-
lating federal law.85 This is exemplified where directors considering the inter-
ests of employees and the community deny tender offers, thereby depriving
shareholders of takeover premiums protected by the Williams Act. However,
the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, defends state
implementation of antitakeover statutes as follows:
It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country
for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to de-
fine the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A State
has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties in-
volved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that in-
vestors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate af-
fairs.8
6
Justice Scalia rejects this argument in his concurring opinion.87 Scalia opines
that "[a]s long as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations
and does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive [the
Court's] scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, whether it promotes share-
81 See Myers, supra note 45, at 474 (stating that constituencies are consistent with the existing under-
standing of the nature of corporations as a nexus of contracts).
82 See id. at 468 (concluding that constituency statutes do not amount to takings).
83 i& at 475-76 (recognizing that constituency "statutes are part of a broad trend toward promoting the
wellbeing of various groups in society").
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f (1994).
85 See id.
86 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
87 See id. at 94-97.
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holder welfare or industrial stagnation." 88 Scalia's statement reflects courts'
general disenchantment with preemption arguments except where Congress
explicitly indicates intent to preempt state action. In reality, "[c]onstituency
statutes address a fundamental issue of corporate governance in an area tradi-
tionally left to the states to define: the nature and extent of directors' fiduciary
duties." 89 A majority of the Supreme Court believes that "[t]o the limited ex-
tent that [a state antitakeover mechanism] affects interstate commerce, this is
justified by the State's interests in defining the attributes of shares in its corpo-
rations and in protecting shareholders." 90 Thus, preemption arguments against
constituency statutes also lack legal foundation.
Opponents of constituency statutes further argue that such legislation vio-
lates the dormant Commerce Clause because the federal government has pur-
posely chosen not to adopt federal legislation includiig constituency statutes.91
The primary purpose of constituency statutes, however, is to promote the inter-
ests of corporations under state legal regimes. Each state has its own corporate
code illustrating the duties and rights of firms incorporating within the jurisdic-
tion.92 No hard evidence exists that constituency statutes discriminate against
interstate commerce. Such legislation is not discriminatory on its face. The
potential of such laws to hinder tender offers has the same effect on offerors
from the corporation's state of incorporation as it does offerors from other
states. Additionally, the Court itself has determined that statutes harmful to an
offeror's ability to take over a corporation do not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 93 Like the others, this constitutional challenge to constituency stat-
utes fails as well.
Certain scholars oppose constituency statutes claiming that states adopt
such legislation only at the urging of executives constantly threatened by
takeovers. 94 Many assert that these statutes increase management discretion,
88 See Orts, supra note 4, at 64 (explaining that Scalia, in his opinion in CTS, expressed how courts dis-
favor preemption arguments); see also CTS, 481 U.S. at 95-96.
89 Orts, supra note 4, at 65 (demonstrating how a majority of the Justices in CTS plainly rejected argu-
ments that constituency statutes violate basic principles of corporate federalism).
90 CTS, 481 U.S. at 94.
91 See Orts, supra note 4, at 51 (demonstrating how opponents of constituency statutes attempt to raise
issue with constituency statutes by arguing that such legislation violates the CTS dormant Commerce Clause
tests).
92 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,383-84 (1911).
93 See CTS, 481 U.S. at 94 (holding that control share statutes restricting the ability of offerors to take
over a corporation do not discriminate against interstate commerce).
94 See Orts, supra note 4, at 49 (illustrating that many critics claim the undue influence of corporate ex-
ecutives on legislators has fed the evolution of constituency statutes in the same manner as other historical
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allowing directors to use such statutes not to do what is best for the
stakeholders, but to increase executives' welfare.95  By giving management
more discretion in decisionmaking, such legislation allows managers to hide
behind the law when those decisions are questioned, making the process one
which benefits managers instead of the constituents they are meant to serve.
9 6
These scholars also mention that managers who support constituency stat-
utes opposed other legislation that would have benefited stakeholders. 9  For
instance, plant closing notification legislation was vehemently opposed by cor-
porate managers. 98 Thus, critics argue that constituency statutes are not neces-
sarily backed by the will of the people and lack careful deliberation by the leg-
islature.99
As a final assault against constituency statutes, opponents argue that they
are too broad, and that if constituency statutes are going to achieve their goals,
stakeholders need to be able to enforce their rights under the statutes.100 As
many of the statutes are written currently, stakeholders do not have an ade-
quate remedy to force consideration of their interests.101 By attempting to
reach too many varying interests, constituency statutes fail to provide a
benchmark for shareholders and stakeholders to hold directors accountable for
developments of corporate law, essentially leading to a "race to laxity" of state corporate statutes); von Stange,
supra note 4, at 483 (asserting that constituency statutes "promote unaccountability by widening the separation
between ownership and control" and enabling management to "hide behind the statutes to justify business de-
cisions" which benefit themselves over shareholders).
95 See Carney, supra note 37, at 423 (arguing that constituency consideration can only exacerbate prob-
lems of management disloyalty); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation As Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 180
(1997) (stating that constituency statutes will enhance managerial discretion by allowing managers to play
constituencies against one another); Rogers, supra note 40, at 778 (suggesting that to deal with this problem,
corporations should use mechanisms to ensure accountability similar to those used in the political arena).
96 See Carney, supra note 37 at 424 ("Under the special pleading of interested managers in many juris-
dictions, friendly legislators have struck a serious blow at management accountability in the context of bids for
corporate control.").
97 See Rogers, supra note 38, at 808-10.
9' See id. at 810.
99 See id.
100 See Fort, supra note 95, at 180 (arguing that having "too many bosses makes it difficult for manage-
ment to effectively and fairly" complete its job); Hanks, supra note 61, at 113 (noting that none of the con-
stituency statutes in effect today provide guidance as to how much weight should be given various constituen-
cies); Leung, supra note 11, at 618 (stating that constituency statutes provide little guidance in defining who is
a stakeholder, thus making the guidelines of protected parties vague and ambiguous); Rogers, supra note 38, at
780 (citing criticism of constituency statutes as reducing management accountability because they are too
broad).
to1 See Leung, supra note 11, at 617-18 (noting that directors are likely to favor shareholders in decision-
making because their position on the board depends on the vote of the equity owners).
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their decisions.1 2 Moreover, constituency statutes as they exist today are per-
missive and discretionary, permitting directors to ignore the interests of stake-
holders in an attempt to keep satisfied those parties that are supplying the capi-
tal for operations-the shareholders.1 3  In this sense, constituency statutes
arguably sacrifice director accountability for diminished consideration of
shareholder interests and unenforceable consideration of stakeholder interests.
IV. ARGUMENTS FAVORING CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Constituency statutes validate the modem trend of stakeholder manage-
ment, present a legal regime consistent with modem theories of the corpora-
tion, and promote a consistent and efficient approach to judicial policing of
corporate fiduciary duties. Proponents of constituency statutes say they exem-
plify an effective means to ensure that the many varying interests affected by a
corporation are given a voice in directors' decisions.' °4 More broadly, one
noted proponent maintains that:
The corporate constituency concept.. . has several benefits. First, by
requiring directors to act in the best interests of the corporation, it
assures shareholders that their money will be invested with the goal
of enhancing long-term corporate wealth and the corporation's ability
to maximize corporate profits. Second, the statutes expressly permit
the directors to take into consideration the interests of other corporate
stakeholders. This affords directors flexibility to balance the
sometimes competing goals and expectations--especially in the
takeover context-of those who have invested in the corporation,
whether through financial capital or human capital. Finally, and
most importantly these statutes embody the best standard for director
decisionmaking. M
Others argue that the relationship between stakeholders and shareholders does
not have to be antagonistic.
106
102 See supra note 101.
103 See Hanks, supra note 61, at 111 (illustrating that it is "difficult enough to determine the best interests
of the corporation and [its] shareholders without also" attempting to consider the best interests of "other
groups with varying characteristics"); Leung, supra note 11, at 617 (analyzing whether constituency statutes
adequately protect the interests of stakeholders).
104 See Wailman, supra note 14, at 169 (illustrating the manner by which constituency statutes impact the
firm and create an optimal result for all constituencies taken as a whole).
105 Id. at 168-69.
106 See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the
Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1994).
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A. Validation of Stakeholder Consideration by Management
Most importantly, constituency statutes legally validate the practice of
stakeholder management, departing from other legal models that solely man-
age shareholder value. 1
07
Employees ... are as much members [of the firm] as shareholders
who provide the capital. Indeed, the employees may have made a
much greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service,
may have less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in
the future of the enterprise than many of the stockholders.
10 8
Constituency statutes support the popular practice of considering a wide spec-
trum of corporate interests beyond those of shareholders.'19
Some commentators argue that shareholders bear the primary risk for cor-
porate decisions and that this is appropriate because of their comparative
wealth and ability to diversify their holdings.110 As a consequence, they say
shareholder interests should be of primary concern in director decision-
making.1I' However, it must be borne in mind that all primary stakeholders of
a firm bear a degree of residual risk from corporate decisions that should not
be overlooked; "[w]hen directors are negligent or engage in self-dealing, there
is no intuitive reason why only shareholders should be entitled to hold direc-
tors to account, because these transgressions also harm other corporate stake-
holders."112
Bondholders may lose their interest payments and possibly their principal,
if the corporation cannot pay them. Managers' jobs are threatened by proposed
takeovers and disagreements with the company's board of directors. Both
managers and employees contribute "human capital," which is often specific to
107 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 4, at 48-49.
10s Id. (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and
Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORI'. L. & SEc. REG. 155, 170 (1982)).
109 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 4, at 48-49.
11o See Van Der Weide, supra note 54, at 36 (arguing that the shareholder primacy model is the most effi-
cient way to balance risks and interests for corporations because of the ability for shareholders to most effec-
tively bear risk).
111 See Easterbrook, supra note 60.
112 Karmel, supra note 46, at 1173 (noting that mechanisms must be developed for holding directors ac-
countable for due care and fair dealing with regard to all constituents); see also Richard B. Tyler, Other Con-
stituency Statutes, 59 Mo. L. REV. 373, 395 (1994) (urging that no single group of constituents has a right to
view itself as the "owner" of a firm and noting that constituencies other than shareholders are often affected
more by takeovers than shareholders due to the fact that such stakeholders are not as diversified as sharehold-
ers).
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the particular corporation. n 3  Moreover, employees invest in the firm during
their training and high productivity years, with the expectation of reaping the
benefits of their investment later in life.114 Layoffs due to restructuring during
a corporate takeover subject employees to great obstacles in making lateral
moves and adversely affect all businesses in the surrounding community.
115
Even though managers, employees, suppliers, and the surrounding community
risk an arguably more significant investment (their primary time and opportu-
nity costs) than the mere financial investment of shareholders-their interests
are not typically considered in major corporate decisions potentially having
life-altering affects on stakeholders. 116  Together, each of these constituent
parts of a corporation affect productivity and deserve consideration and influ-
ence in corporate decisionmaking.
One theorist has remarked that by creating fiduciary duties on the part of
corporate directors toward stakeholders other than shareholders, constituency
statutes hold directors liable for preserving a corporate capital structure that is
fair to all constituencies and truly in the best interests of the corporation.1
7
Another adds that nonshareholder constituents lack an effective means under
existing labor, contract, and corporate laws to protect their human capital in-
vestments in corporations 8 These stakeholders of the firm lack the ability to
113 See Tyler, supra note 112, at395 (discussing the possibility that groups other than shareholders should
be viewed as sharing control of the corporation).
114 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 4, at 5 1-52 (recognizing that if employees' expectation of a return on
human capital investment is breached and their investment reaped by shareholders, then the employees should
have a means of legal recourse).
115 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 300 (1998).
116 See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 622 (stating that a board which cannot delegate its power to an inde-
pendent committee requires consideration of constituent interests to resolve conflicts of interests in which the
board itself might be an interested party); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979)
(stating that "[iun the very nature of the corporate organization it was only the existing board of directors
which had authority on behalf of the corporation to direct the investigation and to assure the cooperation of
corporate employees, and it is only that same board by its own action-or as here pursuant to authority duly
delegated by it-which had authority to decide whether to prosecute the claims against defendant directors").
117 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 4, at 47 (noting that because these fiduciary duties represent a
change from conventional corporate law, constituency statutes have provoked considerable controversy); see
also Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257, 288
(1995) (illustrating how the "Ruder Rule" maintains that the goal of profit maximization does not itself require
a rejection of corporate responsibility to nonshareholder parties).
118 See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 605 (stating that stakeholder interests are not sufficientiy covered under
most corporate laws absent a constituency statute because shareholders-the only parties with standing to sue
under traditional corporate laws-lack sufficient incentive to bring derivative actions unless their own interests
are at stake); Van wezel Stone, supra note 4, at 48 (concluding that constituency statutes, as they are currently
written, probably do not provide adequate protection for employees but nonetheless have a positive social
value in that they recognize employees roles and vulnerability); cf. Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L.
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protect themselves contractually, and thus need a form of constituency statute
to help them assert their rights.n 9 Constituency statutes allow consideration of
those other than shareholders who have contributed to a corporation's success
by allowing all constituencies to influence the decisions of companies they
help operate and depend on for financial security. 12  Moreover, mandating that
directors consider the interests of stakeholders simultaneously benefits direc-
tors by diminishing the likelihood that their decisions on behalf of the corpora-
tion will subject them to legal suits or prevent their re-election to the board.12'
B. Consistency with the Modem Theory of the Corporation
The new corporate regime promoted by constituency statutes reflects the
modem theory of the corporation. Shareholders have an equity stake in corpo-
rations from which they expect to gain economically when share price in-
creases. 12  However, corporations are increasingly financing operations
through issuance of debt instruments such as bonds and debentures. 23  The
amount of profit expected and the level of risk incurred, however, represent the
primary distinctions between the two groups.' 24 Both bondholders and share-
holders expect to make a profit by investing in a corporation. Yet, sharehold-
ers accept more risk than bondholders. 25 As residual claimants, shareholders
REV. 1189 (1991) (arguing that corporations are responsible for the effects of restructuring on their employees
and constituency statutes do not go far enough to provide an adequate legal remedy).
119 See Tyler, supra note 112, at 396 (stating that certain groups are able to bargain for contractual protec-
tions whereas many constituency groups do not have that ability and consequently lack an effective voice in
the corporation).
120 See Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stake-
holder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441,442 (1994) (discussing "how the
renewed appreciation in the corporate law field for the interests of nonshareholder groups interrelates with the
growing sympathy in the bankruptcy law literature for the rights of non-creditor interests in chapter 11").
121 See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 606 (noting the benefits to directors and management of constituency
statutes designed to broaden the groups of interests considered by directors when acting on behalf of the corpo-
ration); von Stange, supra note 4, at 488 (explaining that incumbent management benefits from constituency
statutes because they take away the accountability of management to shareholders).
122 See Henry T.C. Hu, Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379,
381 (1997) (positing that corporate managers "once believed" that making accounting and operating decisions
that increase earnings per share "would maximize the prices at which their shares would trade in the stock
market and thereby maximize the wealth of their shareholders").
123 See Yakov Amihud et al., New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447,449
(1999) (reporting that substantially more capital was raised through selling debt, namely bonds, than stock).
124 See Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSoN L. REV. 121, 150 (1991) (stat-
ing that stakeholders may be entitled to payment for their investments despite the performance of the corpora-
tion, whereas shareholders receive a return only when the company is profitable and successful).
125 See Robert A. Levy, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories & Evidence, 1 GEO, MASON L. REV. 1, 10-
12(1994).
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do not realize profit until all other credit obligations are met.126 Bondholders,
on the other hand, invest in instruments with some guaranteed return127 and a
higher priority than stock in the event of a bankruptcy. 128 Accordingly, share-
holders receive higher rates of return on their investments than bondholders.
Today, practice demonstrates that there are no "owners" of corporations in the
traditional sense.129  The corporation is viewed as a nexus or focal point for a
web of contracts, explicit and implicit, among a variety of participants: stock-
holders, lenders, employees, managers, suppliers, distributors, and custom-
ers. '130 In essence, all the stakeholders of a firm bear residual risk.131 Accord-
ingly, proponents argue that modem corporate directors must consider the
interests of all corporate stakeholders to ensure the best result for society, not
just the best result for shareholders. 132
In most jurisdictions, constituency statutes are permissive, allowing man-
agers and directors to exercise greater discretion in considering broader inter-
ests of the firm, without giving stakeholders any legally enforceable rights.
133
Only one state legislature has adopted a mandatory constituency statute.
134
126 See Easterbrook, supra note 60.
127 See Vladimir Jelisavcic, CORPORATE LAW: A Safe Harbor Proposal to Define the Limits of Direc-
tors' Fiduciary Duty to Creditors in the "Vicinity of Insolvency:" Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe, 18 J. CORP. L.
145, 145-48 n.30-32 (1992).
128 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 507,554,725,726(a) (1994).
129 See McDaniel, supra note 124, at 149 (asserting that ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept
because corporations in modem times are viewed as a nexus of contracts where shareholders are merely risk-
bearers who provide the firm with one form of capital); Myers, supra note 45, at 474 (noting modem under-
standing of corporations as a nexus of contracts); Oswald, supra note 71, at 15 (asserting that corporations
constitute a nexus of contracts).
130 See McDaniel, supra note 124, at 149 (asserting that ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept
where corporations are viewed as a nexus of contracts; shareholders are merely risk-bearers who provide the
firm with one form of capital).
131 See id. at 150-51 (recognizing that managers and employees bear residual risk, in addition to the finan-
cial risk of shareholders, due to their investment of human capital).
132 See John C. Carter, The Rights of Other Corporate Constituencies, 22 MEMPInS ST. U. L. REv. 491
(1992).
133 See supra notes 9, 23-25.
134 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (1999) (requiring that:
A director of a corporation ... shall consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the cor-
poration, (2) the interests of the shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the possi-
bility that those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3)
the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) commu-
nity and societal considerations including those of any community in which any office or other fa-
cility of the corporation is located.
(emphasis added)).
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Other states have an opt-in statute, and simply authorize directors and manag-
ers to consider interests other than those of shareholders if they so choose.
135
If states were to mandate consideration of stakeholder interests, a potential
cause of action might exist if directors overtly neglected to make the consid-
erations required by law. Otherwise, permissive and opt-in statutes as cur-
rently written do not afford stakeholders a cause of action on their face.
136
[Constituency statutes] permit directors to allocate the externalized
costs of rules restraining directorial self-interest among the parties
who benefit from those rules by internalizing those costs.... Seen in
this light, constituency statutes provide a basis for reallocating those
costs among all constituent classes that directly or indirectly benefit
from fiduciary rules.
137
However, the state statutes and court decisions insulate managers from liability
for making decisions that may prove less advantageous to one group but bene-
ficial to the corporation as a whole.138 Corporations constantly act as mediat-
ing institutions, owing a high degree of responsibility to all individuals within
the organization. 139 Accordingly, constituency statutes allow directors to act in
the best interest of the corporation as a whole without constantly fearing litiga-
tion from constituency groups disfavored by particular decisions.
Considering the best interests of the entire corporation through its various
constituencies provides more consistency by maximizing the wealth-producing
value of the firm. 14  A corporation is an entity whose interests will generally
remain the same over an extended period of time. The goals of profit-
maximization and asset growth propel corporations regardless of their age and
level of development. Shareholders, however, are individuals whose interests
change frequently, depending on their age and aversion to risk as well as fi-
nancial market forces outside the corporation. Accordingly, a more consistent
135 See supra notes 23-25.
136 See supra notes 23-25.
137 Mitchell, supra note 4, at 584-85, 594 (asserting that constituency statutes are part of a trend suggest-
ing a need for legal recognition of constituent interests within the corporate structure and are a means of per-
mitting the board to reallocate costs of legal articulations of its duty to shareholders without exposing itself to
additional risks of litigation over conflicts between constituency interests).
131 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A. 251 (1985 & Supp. 2000) (best interest of the corporation); Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Govern-
ance, 84 CORNELLL. Rav. 1133, 1162 n.142 (1999).
139 See Fort, supra note 117, at 288 (arguing that the "Ruder Rule" illustrates how the goal of profit
maximization does not itself require a rejection of corporate responsibility to nonshareholder parties).
140 See Wallman, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that the "best interests of the corporation" standard is the
only one which consistently produces this result).
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result will come from pursuing the goals of a corporate entity rather than seek-
ing to satisfy the constantly changing, volatile goals of shareholders.
C. Judicial Advantages of Constituency Statutes
Widespread state adoption of constituency statutes assists judicial
interpretation of issues of corporate law, especially if a model form of
constituency statute appears feasible. In brief, constituency statutes will assure
that judicial decisions regarding stakeholder management will not shift easily
over time through common law policymaking. Also, compare the variety of
takeover control mechanisms-control share statutes, fair price statutes, poison
pill-shareholder rights statutes, cash out statutes, disgorgement statutes, and
antigreenmail statutes-which have been adopted by more than twenty-nine
states.141 While these measures are beneficial to corporations facing takeovers,
the variety of standards and rules involved prevent consistent practices among
the several states, which seriously complicates operation of multistate
corporations. Corporations relying on one or more of these mechanisms
constantly risk changes in state laws that might require alterations in corporate
governance and could invalidate established corporate practices.
Second, constituency statutes can clarify who has the burden of proof in
shareholder derivative suits, and help avoid the pitfalls of the common law.
The American Law Institute ("ALF") recommends placing the burden of proof
on shareholder plaintiffs for corporate control decisions, as well as for ordinary
business judgment rule and duty of care cases. 142 The "business judgment
rule" provides:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty [of care] if the director or officer:
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judg-
ment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably be-
lieves to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
141 See Orts, supra note 4, at 37-39 (stating that adoption of various antitakeover regimes have helped lead
to the decline of hostile takeovers and a diminished need to resort to constituency statutes in the takeover con-
text).
142 See ANMRICAN LAW INSTrrTE, supra note 1, §§ 2.01; see also Mitchell, supra note 4, at 605 (stating
that the business judgment rule insulates from liability directors who act in good faith in the best interests of
the corporation); Orts, supra note 4, at 90 (illustrating the relationship between the ALI's interpretation of con-
stituency statutes and its business judgment and duty of care schemes, specifically with regard to how each of
these three principles are connected and the need for a common burden of proof).
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(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interest of the corporation.
In short, if a good-faith business decision is made rationally and in an
informed manner, then it is shielded from any further judicial scru-
tiny for "reasonableness."
4 3
The "duty of care standard" provides:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. 114
4
By adopting constituency statutes, legislatures can explicitly designate which
parties carry the burden of proof in derivative suits, further encouraging con-
sistent and predictable legal results. Replacing judicial rulemaking and current
antitakeover mechanisms with constituency statutes helps to ensure uniform
corporate legal regimes among the states, provides predictable and consistent
principles of law to guide corporate decisions, and avoids common law poli-
cymaking through judicial decisions.
D. Ethical Responsibility of the Corporation
In addition to obligations created by implicit contractual relationships be-
tween the corporation and its stakeholders, some scholars argue that a corpora-
tion also has an ethical responsibility to its constituents.14  "High idealism
holds that the business corporation's residual goal, and not just its specific, ex-
ternally imposed legal obligations, should be defined to include a much wider
set of interests than those of the shareholders." 146 Along these lines, scholars
suggest that corporations should be "mediating institutions"--"private organi-
zation[s] with public concerns, foremost being the welfare of internal, non-
143 Orts, supra note 4, at 43 (explaning the basic form of the "business judgment rule"); see also ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 454 (5th ed. 2000).
144 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.30(a) (1991); see also AMERICAN LAW INSITruTE, supra note 1,
§ 4.01(c); Orts, supra note 4, at 43.
145 See Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145, 1145
(1932).
146 Davids, supra note 42, at 201 (asserting that principles transcending the mundane ideals of corporate
legal regimes also mandate that directors consider interests other than just those of the shareholders when mak-
ing corporate decisions that affect a wide group of individuals).
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shareholder constituents."'147 These authorities state that the corporation must
become an institution with a moral identity recognizing an obligation to the
many external constituents who contribute to its existence and success. 148 This
corresponds with the Kantian principle that "human beings should be treated as
ends, not as means to ends. ' 149 According to these authors, constituency stat-
utes recognize and respond to the moral call for corporations to consider the
external effects of their internal decisions by mandating observance of ethical
behavior by directors. 150 They do so without strictly mandating morality, but
by urging recognition of the external elements bringing corporations into exis-
tence within a society.1
5 1
In summary, the numerous advantages of constituency statutes demonstrate
how such legislation enables managers and directors to do what they are hired
or appointed to do-consider the best interests of the corporation as a whole.
The statutes force directors to consider strategies which may be more complex
and the results more difficult to see because they will occur in the long-term
instead of making decisions that only take into consideration shareholder
interests and immediately recognizable benefits. 152  Consequently, con-
stituency statutes promote corporate growth and vitality, which benefits153 ost c h etitrs
shareholders in the long-term. Requiring directors to act in the best interest
of the corporation assures shareholders their money will be invested with the
goal of enhancing long-term corporate wealth and maintaining the
corporation's ability to maximize corporate profits.154 "[T]he statutes expres-
sly permit the directors to take into consideration the interests of other
corporate stakeholders. This affords directors flexibility to balance the
sometimes competing goals and expectations--especially in the takeover
context--of those who have invested in the corporation, whether through
financial capital or human capital.' 1
55
147 Fort, supra note 117, at 279 (arguing that the stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility
should be considered from the perspective of a moral, dialectical theory).
148 Id. at 282 (urging corporations to develop an "internal respect leading to an external respect of other
constituents").
149 Fort, supra note 95, at 184.
150 See Fort, supra note 117, at 282.
151 Id. at 282.
152 See Walman, supra note 14, at 177 (asserting that Ionger-term, complex strategies have results which
are more difficult to perceive but which result in higher discounts being applied to future income streams).
153 See id. at 168 (noting that constituency statutes demand that directors act in the best interests of the
corporation which serves the economy and society better than competing standards).
154 See id. at 169 (listing the benefits of corporate constituency statutes).
155 See id. (concluding that these statutes embody the best standard for director decisionmaking).
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V. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
It is well accepted that "[g]roups in addition to shareholders have claims on
a corporation's assets and earnings because those groups contribute to a corpo-
ration's capital." 156 Additionally,
[T]hose who assert that the obligation of directors should be owed
exclusively to the shareholders because they are 'owners' lose sight
of two key points. First, the overall promotion of societal wealth is
the primary goal of incorporation; providing attractive returns for
shareholders is merely the means.... Second, these proponents leap
to the unsupported conclusion that shareholders will find corporate
investment attractive only if their interests are granted absolute pri-
macy in all contexts.
157
Even before constituency statutes came into existence, the judiciary layed an
important role in defining the scope of corporate social responsibility. In the
1919 case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, the Supreme Court of Michigan
adopted the prominent view of the era in ruling that "[a] business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of shareholders. The pow-
ers of the directors are to be employed for that end."'
159
A shift in this viewpoint was evidenced by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Pepper v. Litton.160 The case seemed to alter a director's
primary obligation to shareholders, emphasizing the "entire community of in-
terests in the corporation."
' 161
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a corporation's manage-
ment may employ defensive tactics to prevent a takeover as long as "(1) the
takeover is seen as a reasonable threat to shareholders, and (2) the target's de-
fensive tactics are reasonably related to that threat."'162 More importantly,
156 Karmel, supra note 46, at 1171 (demonstrating that bondholders provide monetary capital, employees
provide human capital, communities provide governmental services, and customers and suppliers depend on
the corporation for profit, which mitigates against an excessive control premium for shareholders).
157 Wallman, supra note 14, at 167 (refuting the notion that shareholders will dispose of their stock if con-
stituency statutes are given legal effect).
158 See von Stange, supra note 4, at 471-79 (outlining a history of cases developing constituency rights).
159 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 976 (noting that Dodge v.
Ford Motor Company is the classical statement of directors' duty to maximize shareholder wealth).
'60 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
161 Id. at 307; see also von Stange, supra note 4, at 473 (delineating the history of case law dealing with
constituency statutes and noting that the holding in Pepper v. Litton was limited to the unique facts of the
case).
162 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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however, the case permitted consideration of nonshareholder constituencies'
interests in a takeover situation.
163
Other states have invoked constituency statutes in recognizing the propriety
of consideration of the interests of a broad group of constituents. Constituency
statutes have been analyzed in more than one case in Pennsylvania. In Baron
v. Strawbridge & Clother, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld a
corporate board's defensive decision to reclassify its stock in response to the
threat of a tender offer against the company.164  The Pennsylvania court
determined that "[i]t was proper for the company to consider the effects the...
tender offer would have, if successful, on the company's employees, customers
and community." 165 Another Pennsylvania district court employed the then-
current statute to determine the appropriateness of a white knight defense to a
change in control. 166 Thus, the public policies favoring constituency statutes
were acknowledged and accepted by Pennsylvania courts as they invoked the
nation's first adopted constituency statute.
The Eastern District of Wisconsin also acknowledged its state constituency
statute in upholding a board's refusal to redeem poison pill rights in response
to an all-cash, any-or-all shares tender offer. 167 The court concluded that "[t]he
board has acted in accord with its fiduciary responsibilities in a manner
reasonably related to the perceived threat to the corporation, its shareholders,
and other constituencies.' ' 68  Accordingly, the Wisconsin court applied
fiduciary duties on a corporation's directors based upon responsibilities
iterated in the state's constituency statute.
169
163 See id.; see also von Stange, supra note 4, at 476 (citing cases which reveal the degree to which a
board may consider nonshareholder constituencies).
164 646 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
165 Id. at 697.
166 See Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 258 (M.D. Pa. 1987); see also
Davids, supra note 45, at 169 (citing the Pennsylvania court's acknowledgement of "so-called social issues in
evaluating merger proposals").
167 See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 1989);
see also Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 988 (noting that, as of 1992, Amanda Acquisition Corp. represented the
nearest thing to a court interpretation of the validity of a constituency statute); Orts, supra note 4, at 32 (recog-
nizing that the court in Amanda Acquisition Corp. cited Wisconsin's constituency statute in upholding a
board's refusal to redeem poison pill rights).
168 Amanda Acquisition Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1016.
169 See id.
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The federal district court in Maine also applied its state constituency statute
in upholding a poison pill mechanism. 170  The court stated that "Maine law
suggests that the Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests of
the shareholders and corporation [sic] should also consider the interests of the
company's employees, its customers and suppliers, and communities in which
offices of the corporation are located."'171 The use of a state constituency stat-
ute as foundation for the court's argument demonstrates the positive bffect
such legislation has on ensuring stakeholders' interests are considered in
change of control situations.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that directors have social
duties in addition to the obligations owed to shareholders. 172 The court upheld
a charitable donation by a corporation on the basis that "modem conditions re-
quire that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private re-
sponsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate."'173
These cases symbolize judicial acceptance of the principles underlying con-
stituency statutes and state willingness to adopt and invoke constituency stat-
utes directing the conduct of their corporate leaders.
VI. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
Ultimately, many critics of constituency statutes maintain that promoting
the interests of stakeholders leads to a diminution of the weight given share-
holder concerns. 174 Some scholars urge that directors should be encouraged to
consider either shareholder interests or stakeholder interests, and should not be
forced to consider the interests of both parties simultaneously. 175 Commonly
used economic models such as the Pareto efficiency model and the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency model, however, suggest that constituency statutes represent
an efficient regime through which to influence corporate decisions. 176
170 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Me. 1989); see also
Orts, supra note 4, at 32 (illustrating the court's application of Maine's constituency statute in upholding an
antitakeover measure).
171 Georgia-Pacifc Corp., 727 F. Supp. at 33; see also Davids, supra note 42, at 168 (demonstrating the
effect that Maine's constituency statute had on the court's decision in Georgia-Pacific).
172 See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581,586 (N.J. 1953).
173 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 586; see also Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 979 (discussing cases
which state that shareholder wealth maximization is not the sole responsibility of corporate directors),
174 See supra Part Ifi.
175 See supra Part IV.
176 See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND
PRAcrIcE 40-41 (1990) (illustrating Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in terms of comparative utility between compet-
ing interests); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW 14 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining Kaldor-Hicks
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A Kaldor-Hicks efficient result is one in which winners win more than los-
ers lose, meaning the gains of one proposed course of action outweigh the
losses of pursuing that action. 177 Traditional statutory regimes requiring direc-
tors to consider the interests of shareholders are arguably Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient.
178
Constituency statutes, however, also achieve Kaldor-Hicks efficiency by
promoting the interests of the company as a whole in an effort to ensure that
directors consider the interests of all or at least most of the stakeholders while
maximizing profitability and shareholder return in the long run. "The share-
holder primacy doctrine overlooks the distributional consequences of man-
agement decisions, allowing corporations to impose externalities on nonshare-
holders.' 179 Negative externalities exist when a corporation creates costs or
burdens for others but does not itself pay for these detrimental effects of its
business.
18°
The traditional regime imposes externalities on stakeholders who are not
given a voice in the direction of the corporation. Moreover, considering
stakeholder interests is more ideal in the corporate context because it prevents
directors from viewing decisions as correct or "efficient" so long as the
shareholders' benefit is greater than the stakeholders' loss. As a result, Pareto
efficiency may represent a better ideal because it ensures a result in which no
group is made worse off.
181
Perhaps less idealistic than the Kaldor-Hicks model, the Pareto efficient re-
sult is one in which some parties become better situated, and none become
efficiency and its relationship to Pareto superiority); Leung, supra note 11, at 605 (defining Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency as "any outcome where gains exceed losses"); McDaniel, supra note 124, at 127 (concluding that
Pareto efficiency is appropriate for interpreting constituency statutes because control changes will become
more civilized when they are Pareto efficient).
177 See McDaniel, supra note 124, at 127 (explaining that many economists believe a Kaldor-I-ieks effi-
cient transaction should be the goal of a free market).
178 See Leung, supra note 11, at 606 (asserting that considering solely the interests of shareholders results
in maximizing shareholder wealth, even though such a result may benefit or hurt other stakeholders).
179 Id. (stating that constituency statutes better tolerate Kaldor-Hicks results because they still allow some
shareholders to benefit while allowing a vast group of stakeholders to simultaneously realize some gain); see
also McDaniel, supra note 124, at 128 (urging that shareholder confiscation of stakeholder wealth is an exter-
nality in need of correction).
18o See POSNER, supra note 176, at 232 (describing externalities created by a business enterprise); see also
McDaniel, supra note 124, at 127 (quoting Judge Posner and his assertion that the common law must seek to
correct externalities).
181 See Leung, supra note 11, at 606 (arguing that Pareto efficiency is a better method than Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency for evaluating economic outcomes of transactions).
worse off after the dilemma than they were before it.182 This is a better meas-
ure of efficiency because it incorporates distributional effects. 183 Constituency
statutes strive for Pareto efficiency. They represent a Pareto efficient alteration
of traditional corporate statute regimes, allowing a corporation's constituent
stakehoiders to achieve a better result, without making shareholders any worse
off than before implementation of the statutes.184  Stakeholders become better
situated because their interests, previously unconsidered, influence directors
making corporate decisions.
Achieving Pareto efficiency through constituency statutes may arguably re-
quire that shareholders accept lesser gains so stakeholders may benefit.
185
Shareholders too, however, are better situated because constituency statutes
force directors to make decisions in the best interests of the corporation itself,
which ultimately increases productivity and profitability, thus maximizing
shareholder return in the long-term.1
86
Advocates believe all constituents gain significantly under constituency
statutes: stakeholders because their interests, previously neglected under
existing shareholder primacy regimes, come to bear on directors charting the
course of the corporation, and shareholders because they sacrifice only part of
their voice-they remain a constituency group whose interests are to be
considered-in the affairs of the corporation. 87 In the long run, however, all
parties gain from increased efficiency and productivity. "[Cionstituency
statutes represent a starting point in the search for a means to harmonize the
182 See MALLOY, supra note 176, at 39-40 (illustrating Pareto efficiency in terms of comparative utility
between competing interests); POSNER, supra note 176, at 14 (defining Pareto efficiency as a transaction "that
makes at least one person better offand no one worse off"); McDaniel, supra note 124, at 127 (illustrating that
if a transaction is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient, it will not be Pareto efficient, and ifa transaction is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient it may or may not be Pareto efficient).
183 See Leung, supra note 11, at 606 (demonstrating that Pareto efficiency requires that boards examine a
Kaldor-Hicks outcome to ascertain what costs would result from a decision but further requires that the board
refrain from acting unless some means render the transaction Pareto optimal, thus incorporating the principles
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but exacting a more stringent standard).
184 See McDaniel, supra note 124, at 161 (concluding that constituency statutes represent Pareto efficient
outcomes because they seek in the long run to maximize shareholder gain while minimizing stakeholder loss),
185 See Leung, supra note 11, at 606 (stating that shareholders would only have to sacrifice potential gains
in order to ensure that stakeholders were not harmed, which results in no real loss).
186 See supra Part ll.B; see also Leung, supra note 11, at 606 (arguing that Pareto optimality may ulti-
mately be achieved through constituency statutes without shareholder sacrifice).
187 See supra Part IV.
188 See Leung, supra note 11, at 607 ("Pareto efficiency offers a standard by which losses resulting from
conflicts between shareholder and stakeholder interests can be minimized."); McDaniel, supra note 124, at 128
("Pareto efficiency should be viewed as a worthwhile economic goal to strive for even if it is seldom attain-
able.").
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potentially divergent goals of societal welfare and corporate wealth
maximization." 189  Consequently, supporters maintain that constituency
statutes not only represent a positive alternative to implied corporate legal
responsibility, but also constitute an economically efficient scheme for
corporate governance.
VII. A MODEL CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY STATUTE
The "opt-in" form of constituency statute most closely reflects the current
corporate landscape in which directors operate. 19°  Currently, owners of a
business enterprise determine the type of legal entity under which the business
functions, and simultaneously decide how they will operate. By deciding
whether to conduct business as a corporation, limited liability company
("LLC"), or limited liability partnership ("LLP"), founders determine the
statutory regime governing the activities of the firm.191 Moreover, most LLCs
and LLPs constitute organizations wherein managers are also owners.
Accordingly, the interests of shareholders and certain stakeholders are alike in
decisionmaking in LLCs and LLPs. By electing to operate as a corporation
rather than an LLC or LLP, firm owners accept the governance of a different
legal regime, and presumably also accept the potential for consideration of
interests other than solely those of shareholders. 192  Despite this inherent
acceptance, the majority of business enterprises nonetheless elect to operate as
corporations. 193
The predominance of the corporation in modern America substantiates the
fact that business owners willingly recognize the interests of stakeholders for
189 Davids, supra note 42, at 148 (arguing that constituency statutes benefit both society and corporation
itself through allowing both parties to benefit from decisions over the long run).
190 See Orts, supra note 4, at 30 (defining "opt-in" statutes as allowing corporations to opt in for coverage
under the amendment if they wish to do so. If the corporation decides not to opt in for coverage, then the
amendment does not apply to them.).
191 See THOMAS R. HURST & WLLIAM A. GREGORY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1-7
(1999).
192 See supra Parts L.A and ll.B; see also Tyler, supra note 112, at 391 (asserting the supremacy of opt-in
statutes because they "permit the shareholders to decide whether they want to have 'their' corporation include
such a limitation on liability"); Wailman, supra note 14, at 166 (recognizing that each constituency statute is
part of a state corporation code governing interactions among the corporation and various constituencies).
Consideration of interests other than those of shareholders prevails whether or not a constituency statute exists
under the state laws governing the firm. The numerous antitakeover devices discussed in Part I.C effectively
constrain corporate decisionmaking in the takeover context such that in virtually every state corporate directors
are forced to consider the interests of parties other than shareholders.
193 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATIONLAW § 1.1 (1986).
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the sake of the many benefits afforded under state corporation codes. Accord-
ingly, one might assume that adoption of an "opt-in" form of constituency stat-
ute would not compromise the effect of legislation designed to provide stake-
holders with a voice in the management of corporations. Perhaps the best way
to ensure amicable acceptance of constituency statutes is to allow promoters
and shareholders to choose whether constituency statutes will apply to the
management of their firm. 1
94
While the propriety of opt-in constituency statutes seems apparent, manda-
tory constituency statutes appear to provide the best form of governance to en-
sure infiltration of the interests of stakeholders into corporate decisionmaking.
The critical question is what duty corporations owe to society and their varied
constituencies; constituency statutes aim to help determine "the nature and the
scope of ... corporate social responsibility."'195 A constituency statute that
properly balances the need for consideration of varied interests and the need
for shareholders to have the ultimate voice in the governance of the corpora-
tions requires combining mandatory language with the potential for sharehold-
ers to opt out of the constituency regime.
We propose a model statute that exemplifies how states can best ensure that
directors consider the interests of a corporation's numerous constituents.
196
Our formulation serves the interests of constituents through many considera-
tions both implicit and explicit in its construction. First, this model statute cre-
ates a presumption requiring consideration of all constituents of the corpora-
tion in a manner the directors deem appropriate. No action on the part of the
promoters or shareholders of the corporation is required to adopt this default
constituency provision. Moreover, a supermajority vote of the shareholders is
required to alter the presumption away from the interests of constituents. This
structure ensures that this statute will apply to the largest possible number of
corporations and will not face extinction except at the will of a supermajority
of the shareholders. The force of the statute, however, is tempered by the fact
that a proposal for its alteration or abolition may be made by either the board
of directors or the holders of at least ten percent of the corporation's out-
standing capital stock entitled to vote on the matter. Together, these aspects of
194 See Tyler, supra note 112, at 424-25 (noting that it might seem better to permit shareholders to have a
say in whether to make the corporation subject to a constituency statute).
195 von Stange, supra note 4, at 461-62 (illustrating how corporations have an obligation to society be-
cause they are entities created by law).
196 The model statute and an official comment are printed in the text following this Part.
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the proposed model statute guarantee that states' adoption of this constituency
statute will be as effective as possible.
The statute also applies to all determinations of the board of directors; it
does not apply solely in the context of a tender offer, merger, or acquisition of
the company. This allows the interests of a corporation's constituents to
influence all major decisions of the corporation, not only decisions impacting
the continuance or discontinuance of the corporate identity. Accordingly, this
model constituency statute has a broader extension than many traditional
antitakeover mechanisms. Further, the statute applies to all corporations in
existence at the time of its passage and all corporations that will be created in
the future. This aspect also ensures uniformity and continuity in the treatment
of constituents throughout the adopting state.
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MODEL CONSTITUENCY STATUTE
§0000. Responsibilities of directors
Subdivision 1. Presumptive duty of care; liability. Except as otherwise
provided by subdivision 2 of this section, a director shall discharge the duties of
the position of director in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. In
discharging the duties of the position of director, a director shall, in considering
the best interests of the corporation, consider the following factors:
(a) The interests of the corporation's shareholders;
(b) The interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors;
(c) The economy of the State and the nation;
(d) Community and societal considerations, including, without limitation, the
impact of any action upon the communities in or near which the corporation has
offices or operations; and
(e) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, including, without limitation, the possibility that these interests may
be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
The directors can give whatever relative weight to these interests that the
directors determine is consistent with the nature and effect of the particular item of
the business presented for board action. A person who so performs these duties is
not liable by reason of being or having been a director of the corporation.
Subdivision 2. Altering the presumptive duty of care. The standard of
care provided for in subdivision 1 of this section may only be amended as
provided in this subdivision 2.
(a) Where the conditions required by part (b) of this subdivision 2 are met, a
director shall consider only the best interests of the corporation's shareholders in
discharging the duties of the position of director.
(b) The corporation's articles of incorporation may be amended to provide
that the corporation is subject to Subdivision 2 of this section upon:
(1) Either the petition of a majority of the corporation's board of directors
currently holding office or the petition of the holders of at least 10% of the
corporation's outstanding capital stock entitled to vote on the matter; and
(2) The affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the voting power of the
corporation's outstanding capital stock entitled to vote on the matter.
Subdivision 3. Scope of this section. This section shall apply to all
corporations in existence under the laws of the State of _ at the time this
section became effective and to all corporations created under the laws of the State
of _ following the effectiveness of this section.
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OFFICIAL COMMENT
Only a mandatory constituency statute ensures consideration of the inter-
ests of all stakeholders by directors. Opt-in statutes bind directors only if the
shareholders invoke coverage of the statute. Some commentators argue that it
is preferable to allow shareholders to decide for themselves whether to limit
their own directors' liability and their own voice in corporate decisions. See
Richard B. Tyler, Other Constituency Statutes, 59 Mo. L. REV. 373, 424-25
(1994) (noting that it might seem better to permit shareholders to have a say in
whether to make the corporation subject to a constituency statute). Opt-in stat-
utes, however, are counterintuitive because it is difficult to envision sharehold-
ers willingly subordinating the priority of their interests in corporate decision-
making.
If legislatures truly wish to accomplish corporate social responsibility
through constituency statutes, then legislatures must: (1) expressly
mandate consideration for nonshareholder con-stituencies; (2) en-
courage accountability of incumbent management; (3) alter the com-
position of the board of directors to include nonshareholders; and (4)
enable nonshareholder constituencies access to remedies.
Gary von Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Stat-
utes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 490 (1994) (explaining that
constituency statutes may be ineffective unless stakeholders are given standing
to enforce them). Requiring a shareholder vote for constituency statutes to ap-
ply to a corporation reduces the likelihood that such legislation will have any
real effect on directors' decisions. See Tyler, supra, at 391 (illustrating the
problems associated with requiring a shareholder vote and promoting the pref-
erence for statutory enactment rather than appropriate provisions in a corpora-
tion's charter or articles). With this in mind, it would be frivolous to enact a
constituency statute that does not have any real effect, such as opt-in statutes
that require a shareholder vote for applicability to a corporation.
Pennsylvania's constituency statute allows directors to consider the impact
of their decisions on any affected interest and directors "to the extent they
deem appropriate." 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (1999); see also Nell Mi-
now, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 197, 219-20 (1991) (discussing the effects of giving management the dis-
cretion to consider the public interest in the process of making decisions).
They are not required "to regard any corporate interest or the interest of any
protected group ... as a dominant or controlling interest or factor" as long as
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they act in the best interests of the corporation. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(b).
A notable feature of this statute is that it requires no shareholder approval for
application to a Pennsylvania corporation; it is immediately applicable unless
the shareholders opt out of the statute within ninety days. See id.; see also Mi-
now, supra, at 220 (noting the unique opt-out nature of Pennsylvania's con-
stituency statute). Hence, Pennsylvania's statute most closely approximates
the opt-out form of statute that ensures observance of corporate social respon-
sibility ideals by the greatest number of corporations.
Permissive and opt-in statutes do not indicate a true commitment by state
legislatures to ensure corporate decisionmaking includes consideration of
stakeholders. While critics argue that mandatory constituency statutes require
directors to consider interests that are too diverse, mandating consideration of
the interests of all constituents in every decision encourages uniformity in de-
cisionmaking and consistency in applying directors' fiduciary duties. See Ste-
ven M.H. Walman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 175
(1991) (arguing that the interests of shareholders are themselves as diverse as
the interests of other constituents, making decisions of directors inherently
complex even under shareholder primacy regimes). Some state constituency
statutes (i.e. Delaware) contain shareholder primacy requirements that demand
that decisions based on the interests of nonshareholder constituencies must still
bear a rational relationship to the interests of shareholders. See James J.
Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the
1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 102 (1991) (noting that Delaware requirement
leaves unanswered the question whether the "interests" of shareholders means
their interest in the value of their shares or in the welfare of the corporation);
cf Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46
Bus. LAW. 1355, 1369 (1991) (stating that common law requires some benefi-
cial relationship to the interests of shareholders when other constituencies are
considered by a board).
"Interests" means not only the monetary interest of shareholders but also
their interests in making decisions based on the welfare of the corporation.
The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance also contain a
shareholder primacy requirement in describing directors' duty of care. See 1
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDAnTONS § 6.02(b)(2) (1994) (stating that directors
may consider the interests of nonshareholders if doing so does not significantly
disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders). However, the Comments to
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the Principles recognize that "the modem corporation by its nature creates in-
terdependencies with a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a le-
gitimate concern ... [s]hort-term profits may properly be subordinated to rec-
ognition that responsible maintenance of these interdependencies is likely to
contribute to long-term profitability and shareholder gain." Id. § 2.01 cmt. f, at
57. Therefore, while the Principles do not impose any legal duty on directors,
they do recognize that the consideration of other interests is appropriate. See
id. § 2.01 cmts. a-i, at 55-69.
A mandatory constituency statute obtains the best results for a corpora-
tion's varied constituents as well as for the corporation itself. Only a manda-
tory statute strictly obligates corporations to consider the concerns of individu-
als and groups other than shareholders. Permissive statutes, the form adopted
by most states, do not have any binding effect on directors because they do not
strictly require consideration of stakeholder interests. See R. Cammon Turner,
Shareholders vs. the World: 'Revlon Duties' and State Constituency Statutes,
Bus. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 32, 34 (noting that most constituency stat-
utes currently do not specify the weight that should be accorded to a particular
factor or constituency, and also noting that shareholders are the only corporate
constituency that can legally enforce a breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the
corporation). Stakeholders need to be given standing to sue; otherwise, con-
stituency statutes lack the power necessary to guarantee consideration of non-
shareholder interests. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corpora-
tion's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1234 (1991) (criticizing constituency statutes
for not providing standing to stakeholder groups to sue directors for failure to
consider nonshareholder interests). Management should recognize that it owes
affirmative obligations to its constituents and should bear the burden of prov-
ing that it has fulfilled those obligations. See id. (stating that directors should
not be able to hide behind the shield of constituency statutes when it does not
properly consider the investment of its nonshareholders). A statutory regime
like the one proposed above protects shareholders by informing them of the
policies prior to investment decisions and ensures that corporate decisions will
be made in the best interests of the corporation as a whole.
Because all states have adopted their own form of corporate code, there is
no guarantee for adoption of one form of constituency statute. Thus, this
model constituency statute faces obstacles to widespread implementation and
consistency among states.
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Corporations that opt not to be governed by constituency statutes will ar-
guably retain a reputation advantage over firms that are governed by constitu-
ency statutes. Shareholders who insist that their investment be maximized at
the expense of the interests of stakeholders will presumably invest only in
companies that are not governed by constituency statutes. See Mark E. Van
Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27, 73 (1996) (arguing that this phenomenon would reduce equity in-
vestment and increase the cost of raising capital, resulting in a decline in cor-
porate growth and productivity).
Even if a mandatory form of constituency statute is adopted by most states,
constituents will inherently lack the power to enforce their rights under such
laws. Because constituency statutes by definition require directors to consider
a wide variety of interests; no one interest is automatically more important than
another. Consequently, constituency statutes will give directors more leeway
by perpetually providing them with the excuse that a derogation of the interests
of one constituent group was necessary to pursue the interests of another
group.
VIn. CONCLUSION
Constituency statutes represent a logical continuation of historical ideas
and the common law trend, as well as the most desirable pronouncement of di-
rector fiduciary duties for the future.
The statutory framework proposed by this Article represents a step forward
in the process of achieving fair, efficient, and consistent results for all corpo-
rate constituents.
The mandatory, opt-out structure of the model statute ensures that it will
have the broadest possible application and confer standing for stakeholders.
Moreover, requiring encouraging consideration of the best interests of the cor-
poration's multiple constituencies will achieve optimal results for firms in the
long-term, an end that will benefit all constituents, including shareholders.
[Vol. 49
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APPENDIX: CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
A. Introduction
Constituency Statutes ("CS") or nonstockholder constituency statutes pro-
vide directors with a legal basis for considering nonshareholder interests.
B. Legislative Intent
Most legislatures enacted these statutes to facilitate directors' consideration
of long-term corporate interests and societal welfare rather than solely or pri-
marily short-term shareholder welfare. For example, the committee comment
accompanying Ohio's 1984 amendments authorizing directors to consider non-
shareholders stated that it was believed that existing law permitted directors to
consider nonshareholder interests and that the amendment was intended to
"specify and clarify the breadth of the interests" which directors could consider.
OHIO ST. BAR ASS'N, CORP. LAW COMM. COMMENT REP. 540 (1984).
Indiana's general assembly has stated:
In enacting this article, the general assembly established corporate
governance rules for Indiana corporations .... The general assembly
intends to reaffirm certain of these corporate governance rules to en-
sure that the directors of Indiana corporations, in exercising their
business judgment, are not required to approve a proposed corporate
action if the directors in good faith determine, after considering and
weighing as they deem appropriate the effects of such action on the
corporation's constituents, that such action is not in the best interests
of the corporation .... Therefore, the general assembly intends:
(1) To reaffirm that this section allows directors the full dis-
cretion to weigh [nonshareholder constituency] factors...
(2) To protect both directors and the validity of corporate ac-
tion taken by them in the good faith exercise of their business
judgment after reasonable investigation.
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (Michie 1999).
C. Typical Terminology
Nonshareholder Interests:
The statutes vary greatly in the degree of discretion given to directors.
Among the factors directors are allowed to consider are:
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(1) short term and long term interests of the corporation and its sub-
sidiaries;
(2) interests of, or effects on, current and retired employees, custom-
ers, creditors, and suppliers; and
(3) communities in which the corporation and its subsidiaries oper-
ate interests of, or effects on, the local, state, and national economies.
Opt-in:
Georgia requires that shareholders elect to be covered by amending articles
of incorporation. It is the only state requiring this measure.
D. Summary of State Statutes
STATE AND
CITATION
Arizona
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-2701
(West 1996).
Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-756 (West
1997).
NONSHAREHOLDER
INTERESTS TO CONSIDER
LIMITS ON SCOPE
OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
A director shall consider the long-
term as well as short-term interests
of the corporation and its share-
holders, including the possibility
that long-term interests may be best
served by the continued independ-
ence of the corporation.
In takeover context:
(1) The long-term as well as short-
term interests of corporation;
(2) The long-term as well as short-
term interests of shareholders;
(3) Employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers;
(4) Community and society;
EXPRESS
DUTIES
OR
LIMIT
ON
BOARD
DUTIES
* mandatory
consideration
- "this sec-
tion shall not
modify the
duties of the
position of
director in
any matter
outside the
scope of this
chapter."
mandatory
consideration
in a takeover
context (di-
rector "shall
consider..
.11)
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Florida
RA. STAT. ANN. §
607.0830(3) (West
1993 & Supp. 2001).
Georaia
GA. CODE. ANN. §
14-2-202(b)(5) (1994
& Supp. 2000).
Hawaii
HAW. REV. STAT. §
415-35 (1993 &
Supp. 1999).
(5) The possibility that long term
interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the cor-
poration; and
(6) Any other factors director rea-
sonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.
(a) Long-term prospects and inter-
ests of the corporation and its
shareholders, and the (b) social,
economic, legal, or other effects of
any action on:
(1) Employees, suppliers and cus-
tomers;
(2) Communities and society; and
(3) Economy of state and of the
nation. [shareholders also men-
tioned)
(1) Employees, customers, suppli-
ers, and creditors;
(2) Communities; and
(3) "All other factors such directors
consider pertinent."
A director may consider:
(1) Employees, customers, suppli-
ers, and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state and na-
tion;
(3) Community and societal consid-
none none
none These provi-
sions "shall
be deemed
solely to
grant discre-
tionary au-
thority to the
directors and
shall not be
deemed to
provide to
any constitu-
ency any
right to be
considered."
none none
Idaho
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-
1602 (1999).
Illinois
805 ILL. COMP. Stat.
5/8.85 (West 1999).
Indiana
IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1-35-1(d) (Michie
1999).
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erations (without limitation); and
(4) The long-term as well as short-
term interests of the corporation,
including, without limitation, the
possibility that long term interests
may be best served by the contin-
ued independence of the corpora-
tion.
(1) Employees, suppliers, custom-
ers, and community; and
(2) The long-term as well as short-
term interests of the corporation,
including, without limitation, the
possibility that these interests may
be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.
Board of directors, committee of
board, individual directors and in-
dividual officers may consider:
(1) Employees, suppliers, and cus-
tomers;
(2) Communities; and
(3) All other pertinent factors.
In any matter, a board may consider
both the short term and long term
best interests of the corporation; A
director may consider:
(1) Employees, suppliers and cus-
tomers;
(2) Communities; and
(3) "[A]ny other factors directors
consider pertinent."
none
Determination of a
majority of the dis-
interested directors
of the board of di-
rectors "shall con-
clusively be pre-
sumed to be valid
unless it can be
demonstrated that
the determination
was not made in
good faith after rea-
sonable investiga-
tion."
[Vol. 49
mandatory
consideration
of long-term
interests
none
-Directors
are not re-
quired to
consider the
effects of a
proposed
corporate
action on any
particular
corporate
constituency
as control-
ling.
- If the board
of directors
determines to
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Iowa
IOWA CODE ANN. §
490.1108 (West 1999).
Kentucky
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.12-210(4) (Michie
1989 & Supp. 2000).
In takeover context, a director may
consider:
1) Employees, suppliers, creditors, and
customers;
(2) Communities; and
(3) The long term and short term inter-
ests of the corporation, including the
possibility that long term interests may
be best served by the continued inde-
pendence of the corporation.
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considera-
tions; and
(4) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
reject an of-
fer it deems
not in the
best interest
of the corpo-
ration, the
board of di-
rectors has
no obligation
to refrain
from oppos-
ing offer
"If the board
of directors
determines to
reject [an
offer it
deems not in
the best in-
terest of the
corporation],
the board of
directors has
no obligation
to [refrain
from oppos-
ing offer]."
"Consideration
of any or all of
the community
interest factors
in not a viola-
tion of the
business
judgment rule
or of any duty
of the director
to the share-
holders ..."
none none
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Louisiana
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
12:92(G) (West 1994).
Maine
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit
13-A, § 716 (West 1981
& Supp. 2000).
Maryland
MD. CODE ANN.,
CoRPs. & ASS'NS § 2-
104(9) (1999).
Massachusetts
MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN., ch. 156B, § 65
(West 1996).
Minnesota
MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.251(5) (West
1985 & Supp. 2001).
In takeover context, directors may
consider:
(1) Offeror's consideration; estimated
future and liquidation prices; premi-
ums paid other corporations in similar
transactions; political, economic, and
other factors bearing on stock prices
and corporation's financial condition
and future prospects;
(2) Social and economic effects on
employees, customers, creditors, and
communities; and
(3) Offeror's financial condition, com-
petence, experience, and integrity.
The directors and officers may con-
sider:
(1) Effects on employees, customers,
creditors, and communities; and
(2) All other pertinent factors.
In takeover context, the board of direc-
tors may consider.
(1) Stockholders, employees, suppli-
ers, customers, and creditors; and
(2) Communities.
A director may consider:
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state, region, and
nation, community and societal con-
siderations; and
(3) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion. {shareholders also mentioned)
A director may consider:
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state and nation,
none none
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Missouri
Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.347(1) (West 1991).
Nebraska
NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-
2432(2) (1997).
Nevada
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 78.138 (4) (Michie
1999).
community and societal considera-
tions; and
(3) The possibility that long term
interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the
corporation. [shareholders also
mentioned)
In takeover context, the board of direc-
tors may consider.
(1) Social, legal, and economic effects
on employees, suppliers, customers
and others having similar relationships
with corporation;
(2) Communities;
(3) Offeror's price in relation to
board's estimate of current and future
value of corporation;
(4) Political, economic and other fac-
tors bearing on security prices gener-
ally or the current market value of the
corporation's securities in particular,
and
(5) Offeror's integrity, financial
wherewithal and competence. {share-
holders also mentioned)
A director may consider: Employees,
suppliers, and customers of corpora-
tion, and communities.
A director may consider:
(1) The interests of the corporation's
employees, suppliers, creditors and
customers;
(2) The economy of the state and na-
tion;
(3) The interests of the community and
of society; and
none Directors are
not required
to respond to
any particu-
lar acquisi-
tion proposal.
none none
none none
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New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:6-1 (West 1969 &
Supp. 2000).
New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-
11-35(D) (Michie 1983).
New York
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §
717(b) (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 2001).
(4) The long-term as well as short-
term interests of the corporation and
its stockholders, including the possi-
bility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence
of the corporation.
Where change of control is involved,
directors may consider long and short
term interests of corporation and
shareholders.
A director may consider.
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state and nation;
(3) Impact on community; and
(4) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion.
A director may consider a corpora-
tion's:
(1) Growth prospects;
(2) Employees, customers and credi-
tors; and
(3) Ability to contribute to communi-
ties as a going concern. f shareholders
also mentionedI
If the board
of directors
determines to
reject an of-
fer it deems
not in the
best interest
of the corpo-
ration, the
board of di-
rectors has
no obligation
to refrain
from oppos-
ing offer
none
none Statute does
not "create
any duties
owed by any
director to
any person..
. or
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abrogate any
duty of the
directors ...
North Dakota
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
19.1-50(6) (1995 &
Supp. 1999).
Ohio
OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1701.13(F)(7),
1701.59(A)(D)(E)
(Anderson 1997 &
Supp. 2001).
A director may consider:
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors;
(2) Economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considera-
tions; and
(4) Long-term and short-term interests
of corporation and the possibility that
they may be best served by the
continued independence of the
corporation.
A director may consider.
(1) Employees, suppliers, creditors,
customers;
(2) Community and societal considera-
tions; economy of Ohio and of the
nation;
(3) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion; and
(4) Effect of any future indebtedness.
The time
frame is at
directors'
discretion.
• Directors
may resist a
change or po-
tential change
in control of
the corpora-
tion if they, by
a majority vote
of a quorum,
determine that
the change or
potential
change is op-
posed to or not
in the best
interests of the
corporation.
• The clear and
convincing
evidence stan-
dard's used for
changes in
control.
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-Directors
will be scruti-
nized solely
under the or-
dinary busi-
ness judgment
rule (i.e., Ohio
rejects height-
ened Unocal
standard).
Oregon
OR. REv. STAT. §
60.357 (1988).
Pennsylvania
15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 515 (West
1995).
In a takeover context, directors may
consider:
(1) Social, legal, and economic effects
on employees, suppliers, customers
and on the communities and areas in
which corporation operates;
(2) Economy of Oregon and of the
nation;
(3) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion; and
(4) Other relevant factors. (sharehold-
ers also mentioned)
none none
The board, a committee of the board, - Board ac- * Section
or individual directors may consider: tions affecting 1721 "does
(1) Employees, suppliers, customers; an acquisition not impose
(2) Community; to which a upon the
(3) The effects of changes in control majority of board of di-
on all constituencies (including credi- disinterested rectors...
tors); directors as- any legal...
(4) Benefits from long term plans and sent are pre- duties...."
the possibility that the interests may be sumed to be in -"Directors
best served by remaining independent; the best inter- shall not be
and ests of the required...
(5) Resources, intent and conduct of corporation to regard any
suitor. (i.e. clear and corporate
convincing interests [as
evidence stan- dominant]."
dard). • Directors
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Rhode Island
R.L GEN LAWs § 7-5.2-
8 (1999).
The board or committees therefrom, or
individual directors may consider:.
(1) Employees, suppliers, creditors,
customers;
(2) Community; and
(3) The possibility that long-term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion.
- Nonshare-
holder con-
stituencies are
denied stand-
ing.
- Absent a
breach of fidu-
ciary duty,
lack of good
faith, or self-
dealing, a di-
rector will not
be subject to
Unocal's
heightened
burden of
proof.
none
not required
to redeem
poison pills
or to take any
action solely
because of
the effect on
potential ac-
quisitions.
"[I]f the
board of di-
rectors de-
termines that
any business
combination
is not in the
best interests
of the corpo-
ration, it may
reject the
business
combination.
... The
board has no
obligation to
facilitate, to
remove any
barriers to, or
to refrain
from imped-
ing, the busi-
ness combi-
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nation."
South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
47-33-4 (Michie 2000).
Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
103-204 (1995).
Vermont
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.I A
§ 8.30 (1997 & Supp.
1999).
In takeover context, board and indi-
vidual directors may consider.
(1) Employees, suppliers, creditors,
customers;
(2) Community and societal considera-
tions;
(3) The economy of South Dakota and
of the nation; and
(4) The possibility that long-term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion.
In takeover context, resident corpora-
tions, its officers, and its directors
shall not be held liable for consider-
ing:
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
communities; and
(2) Any other relevant factor.
A director may consider:
(1) Employees, suppliers, creditors
and customers;
(2) Economy of the state, region, and
nation;
(3) Community and societal considera-
* "The consid-
eration of
those factors
shall not con-
stitute a viola-
tion of the
director's fi-
duciary duty to
the corpora-
tion or its
shareholders..
* If the board
rejects a busi-
ness combina-
tion, it "shall
have no obli-
gation to fa-
cilitate, re-
move any
barriers to, or
refrain from
impeding the
proposal or the
offer."
Corporation,
directors, and
officers are not
liable.
If the board
of directors
determines to
reject an of-
fer it deems
not in the
best interest
of the corpo-
ration, the
board of di-
rectors has
no obligation
to refrain
from oppos-
ing offer
none
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Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
727.1 (Michie 1999).
Wisconsin
'VIS. STAT. ANN. §
180.0827 (West 1992).
Wyoming
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-
16-830 (Michie 1999).
tions; and
(4) Long and short-term interests and
the possibility that those interest may
best be served by the continued inde-
pendence of the corporation.
A director may consider the possibility
that those interests may best be served
by the continued independence of the
corporation.
A director or officer may consider.
(1) Employees, customers, suppliers,
(2) Communities; and
(3) Any other relevant factor.
A director may consider.
(1) Employees, suppliers, creditors,
customers;
(2) Communities;
(3) Economies of Wyoming and of the
nation;
(4) The possibility that long term in-
terests may be best served by the con-
tinued independence of the corpora-
tion; and
(5) "Any other factors relevant to
promoting or preserving public or
community interests." (bondholders
specifically mentioned}
none none
none none
none none
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